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of a constructive trust, of which the daughters are the beneficiaries:
Id., p. 217, et seq.
The children having long ago arrived at majority, the express trust
has, for anything that appears in the case, been fully discharged. This
fact does not, however, enlarge the estate originally vested in her. That
is fixed by the will; and by the discharge of the trust it is relieved of
a burden, but not enlarged.
Here, then, is a constructive trust, as to which Judge REDFIELD, in
his work on Wills, vol. 3, p. 522, sums up the law in the following clear
and explicit language: " However slight or precarious the interest, so
long as one holds possession of an estate or property in any fiduciary
relation, he cannot deal with it for his ow. advantage, in any manner or
to any extent." Mrs. Hall, therefore, could not convert the personalty
into realty for her own" advantage ; could not convert her life estate in
the personalty into a fee simple in real estate, and thus cut off the daugh-
ters of John Hall from the provision he had made for them. Equity,
regarding that as having been done which ought to have been done,
will treat this real estate precisely as though she had taken a convey-
ance of the legal title to herself for life, with remainder to the
daughters.
With respect to the personal estate left by Mrs. Hall at her death, the
fact would seem to be that it is the accumulation of the long term
during which she has had the use of the real estate. No part of it is
traced to the personalty left by the testator; and the income of the real
estate must have been greatly in excess of her expenses after the child-
ren arrived at maturity. She will therefore be held as the absolute
owner of this personalty, and a decree entered accordingly.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.'
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
2
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.'
AGENT.
Liability of a del credere Agent-Liability of an Agent aqpon his
Endorsement, as between himself and is Princi.pal-Demand and .Ao.
dce.-An agent who undertakes to procure a particular person to deal
with his principal, and in consideration of an additional commission
allowed him, guarantees the payment of all bills of goods purchased of
his principal by such customer, is a del credere agent, and as such is
I From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 6 or 7 Kansas Rep.
2 From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 33 .Ad. Rep.
3 From H1. K. Clarke, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 20 Alich. Rep.
4 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol: 59 of his reports.
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primarily liable to satisfy his principal the price of the goods sold:
Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md.
A factor acting under a del credere commission, collected the proceeds
of a bill of goods sold by his principal to a particular customer, and
placed the money to his own account with his bankers, and purchased
of them a gold draft payable to his own order, which he specially en-
dorsed, without excluding recourse, and transmitted to his principal.
The draft included not only the money collected by the agent but also
a balance due from himself to his principal. The draft was afterwards
dishonored. Prior to the presentation of the draft for payment, the
drawers thereof failed. In an action by the principal against the agent
to recover the amount of theadraft, Beld, 1st, That the agent was bound
not only for the collection of the money, but for its safe transmission to
his principal. 2d. 'That the endorsement by the agent imported primfl
facie liability on his part, but he was entitled to show as a matter of
defence that it was not the intention that he should be personally
charged by his endorsement, and if there were no intention to create
personal liability, none would exist as between himself and his princi-
pal. 3d. That whether such intention exists or not, will in all cases
depend upon the circumstances of the transaction, but the circumstances
must be clear and strong to remove the presumption which arises from
the endorsement: Id.
A del credere agent for the purpose of remitting certain moneys which
he had received belonging to his principal, as also moneys due by him-
self, purchased a gold draft payable to his own order, which he specially
endorsed and transmitted to his principal. The draft was dishonored
and returned to the agent, who retained it and made efforts to procure
its payment to himself, and failing in this, procured the drawers of the
draft to secure him among their first preferred creditors in a deed of
trust. The agent notified his principal of these proceedings. After
the dishonor and return of the draft, the agent treated the loss thereon
as his own, and promised his principal to send him another draft. In an
action by the principal to charge the agent as endorser on the draft, Held,
That the promise or undertaking by the agent to pay the debt, was
not sufficient to bind him as endorser, unless at the time of such pro-
mise or undertaking he was fully informed that there had not been due
demand, and notice of dishonor. And a prayer which did not submit
to the jury to find whether the agent was fully informed, at the time of
such promise or undertaking, of all the facts and circumstances of the
neglect to make demand and to give notice, was defective : rd.
A promise by an endorser to pay a draft, subsequent to its dishonor,
is presumptive evidence that the draft had been presented for payment
in due time and dishonored, and that he had received due notice thereof.
This presumption however is one of fact for the jury, and not an abso-
lute legal conclusion to be drawn by the court. It is primd facie only,
and liable to be rebutted. Id.
AGREEMENT.
Construction of " Secures."-By an agreement for the sale and pur-
chase of real estate, the vendor covenanted to sell and convey the same
as soon as the purchaser "secures the payment of the" purchase price.
Held, that the word "secures" was used in its popular signification, and
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that signification was not equivalent to payment in money, but implied
something given and received, by means of which payment might at
some future time be procured or compelled. That it implied a term of
credit; but how long that credit was to be, or what security should be
given, was left unprovided for: Foot v. Webb, 59 Barb.
Statement of Consideration.-By the same agreement, the vendor
agreed to sell and convey the premises "in consideration of the sum of
$700," and the agreement was signed and sealed by both parties. field,
that this was a sufficient statement of the consideration to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds: Id.
When void for Uncertainty.-The owner of a lot, by a written agree-
ment, covenanted "to sell and convey all that piece or parcel of land
situated on the corner of the public green, now occupied as a store," to
the plaintiff, in consideration, &c. " To be conveyed as soon as the
party of the second part (the plaintiff) secures the payment of the
same." field, that the agreement was void for uncertainty, because it
did not fix the term of credit, nor the kind or nature of the security
to be given for the purchase-money, and there was nothing to show
that any part of such agreement rested in parol: Id.
AMENDMENT.
Party's Riame.-Correcting a mistake in the name of a party, where
that party is fully described in the pleading, does not change substan-
tially the claim or defence, and is no ground for reversal: Dewy v.
.McLain, 6 or 7 Kansas.
ASSIGNMENT.
How to be Construed.-A transfer of stock, absolute and uncondi-
tional in its terms, expressing a consideration, and vesting in the assignee
a complete and perfect title to the interest of the assignor in such stock,
and a written memorandum of the transaction, of the same date, signed
by the same parties and by a third person as surety for the assignee,
executed and delivered at the same interview, and in response to a
demand of the assignor, for a memorandum of the transaction, must
be regarded as delivered at one and the same time, for the same purpose,
and should be deemed different parts of the same instrument, and con-
strued together: Parks v. Comstock, 59 Barb.
Sealing.-And such memorandum being a part of the assignment,
and the two one instrument, a seal to each is unnecessary; one seal
will suffice for both. If a separate instrument, and executed even after
the assignment, it would operate as a defeasance, in equity, and (since
the Code) at law, though not under seal: Id.
AUCTION.
Highest Bidder.-The "highest bidder" is one who makes the highest
bid in good faith. A trustee is not bound to accept every bid, and the
court will always sustain him in refusing bids which would manifestly
frustrate the very object and purpose of a sale : Gray v. Viers, 33 Md.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Agent.
Evidence of Transfer-Insanity of Payee.-Evidence that the payee
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
of a negotiable instrument, payable to order, was insane during all the
time from the issuing of the paper until the death of the payee, is
admissible to disprove the validity of the transfer: Hannahs v. Shel-
don) 20 Mich.
CONFEDERATE NOTES.
Validiy of a Contract between Parties residing in Tennessee, during
'the ascendancy of the Confederate Government.-A note given in the
state of Tennessee, during the ascendancy of the Confederate Govern-
ment, for a loan in Confederate money, payable two years after date,
with interest from date, in current bankable funds, is valid, and the
payee, in an action instituted after the overthrow of the Confederacy,
is entitled to recover the face value of the note, with interest, in United
States currency: Taylor v. Turley, 33 Md.
CONFISCATION.
Act of 1862.-Where real estate is seized, confiscated and sold under
the provisions of the law of Congress of July 17th 1862, only the life
estate is seized and sold, and the state limitation law of February 20th
1864, does not affect the right of the reversioner to recover the posses-
sion of the realty, after the termination of such life estate: Dewy v.
illcLain, 6 or 7 Kansas.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Bighway.
Limits of State Laws.-Under a statute of Pennsylvania it was pro-
vided that the total amount of the debts and liabilities (other than the
capital stock) of certain companies should never exceed the amount of
their capital actually paid in; and if any debts or liabilities should be
contracted exceeding the said amount, the directors and officers con-
tracting the same, or assenting thereto, should be jointly and severally
liable in their individual capacities for the whole amount of such
excess, and the same might be recovered by action of debt as in other
cases. Held, that the liability imposed upon the directors and officers
of such corporations is in the nature of a penalty, and can only be
enforced within the limits of Pennsylvania: _First N. B. of Plymouth
v. Price, 83 Md.
OURTS. See Evidence.
Session-Adournment.-A court legally opened for all general pur-
poses continues in session until it adjourns sine die, or expires by law,
and when an adjournment is made from Saturday till Monday, and
from unavoidable cause the court does not convene until Wednesday,
the term not having then expired by law, the court is legally constituted,
and its acts are valid and binding: Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hand,
6 or 7 Kansas.
COVENANT.
Breach of Contract-Separate Covenants.-Covenants in a contract
by which one party agrees to pay taxes on laud belonging to the other;
and also that he will make up to the other any deficiency, on the sale of
the land below a specified sum; are separate covenants; and the breach
of the covenant to pay taxes can have no effect on the conditions relat-
ingto the other: Eldridge v. Bliss, 20 Mich.
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CRIMINAL LAW.
Criminal Pleading-Statement of Offence.-The averment in an
information for obtaining money under false pretences,-that certain
representations as to the quantity and value of land which the accused
was about to sell to the party to whom the representations were made,
were false, "by means of which said false pretences" the money was
obtained,-there being no averment of facts showing any connection
between the representations and the alleged result, is essentially de-
fective : Enders v. Peopl, 20 Mich.
The statute (Comp. Laws, sect. 6059) which provides that after
verdict, an indictment for certain offences shall be held sufficient "if
it describe the offence in the words of the statute," is not to be con-
strued to excuse the neglect to aver any fact essential to the description
of an offence; and such defect appearing, the judgment should be
arrested on motion, or will be reversed on error: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Assignmentfor Benefit of Creditors.-An assignment of property for
the benefit of creditors, is not necessarily and per se void : Johnson,
Garnishee of Johnson v. Ingersoll, 6 or 7 Kansas.
Property held by an assignee under a valid assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors, is not subject to attachment or garnishment for the
debts of the assignor: Id.
Fraudulent Assignment.-If a party has assigned any portion of his
property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, such action will
sustain an order of attachment issued against him on such grounds:
Johnson v. Laughlin, 6 or 7 Kansas.
DEED, See Assignment.
Unsevered Crops.-Ripe crops, although no longer drawing nourish-
ment from the ground, will, if still unsevered, pass by a conveyance of
the land: Tripp v. Rasceig, 20 Mich.
Reforminq Deeds in Equity-Mistake.-To establish, according to
principles administered by courts of equity, a mistake, in order to obtain
the reformation' of a deed, there must be not only an error on both
sides, but the mistake must be admitted or directly proved: Id.
DIVORCE. See Husband and Wife.
EVIDENCE.
Nul tiel Record- hange in the form of Process-Renewals of Pro-
cess- What constitutes the record of a Case.-An action was instituted
on the 3d of December 1859, on a sheriff's bond, and a writ of sum-
mons issued, which was returned "cannot be found;" the writ was
renewed from term to term, until it was served upon four of the defend-
ants who appeared, the other defendant having died. The parties con-
tinued the same in all the writs, and those issued oubsequently to
the first, differed from it only in stating the cause of action and the
amount claimed, so as to conform to the requirements of sect. 84, art.
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75 of the Code of Public General Laws. Upon an issue joined upon
a rejoinder of nul tiel record, it was held:
1st. That the several writs of summons, together with the docket-
entries, were proper to be offered to the court to prove the record of the
cause, but were not admissible as evidence to the jury.
2d. That the mere change in the form of process, so as to make it
conform to the requirements of the Code, did not have the effect either
of putting an end to the suit, which had been instituted prior to the
adoption of the Code, or of making it a new and different action.
3d. That after the adoption of the Code, it became necessary that all
renewals of process in cases then pending, should conform to its require-
ments: State.for -use of Nesbitt v. Logan, 33 Md.
The summons, returns, pleadings, and all other proceedings in a
cause constitute thd record, and are admissible, upon a plea of nul tiel
record, to prove what has been done in the cause : Id.
During the progress of a cause, the court has control of its proceed-
ings therein, and where mistakes or omissions occur in the docket-
entries, it has the right to correct and amend them: Id.
EQUITY. See Husband and Wife; Specific Performance.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Agreement.
Tarol Agreement.-By a deed of bargain and sale, the title in fee to
certain lands was conveyed to the vendees who paid the purchase-money.
The deed was in form and character what the parties thereto intended
it to be. At the time of the conveyance the vendees agreed in parol
to sell the land and credit any profits which might be made from such
a sale, upon a certain indebtedness to them. A portion of the land was
sold and profits were realized, but the vendees refused to credit the same
according to their agreement. Beld, that the agreement could not be
enforced: Kidd v. Carson, 33 Md.
Guaranty- Variance between the Allegata and Probata.-The plaintiff
declared for a sum of money due for wood furnished a third party "on
the credit and guaranty of the defendant," and by his proof rested his
right to recover upon a parol contract: Held, that to entitle the plain-
tiff to recover, it was necessary to show that credit was given solely and
exclusively to the defendant. If any credit were given to the third
party, the undertaking on the part of the defendant was collateral, and
being in parol was void under the Statute of Frauds : Norris v. Gra-
ham, 33 Md.
If in an action brought to recover money alleged to be due for wood
furnished a third party "on the credit and guaranty of the defendant,"
the evidence shows that the defendant contracted with and purchased
the wood from the plaintiff, and was to pay for it, there is a variance
between the allegata and probata, and the plaintiff cannot recover: Id.
Parol promse to pay the Debt of another.-A parol promise to pay
the debt of another, in consideration of forbearance to sue the original
debtor, without any new or superadded consideration moving from the
creditor to the promissor, is not enforceable, being within the Statute
of Frauds: Thomas v. Delphy, 33 Md.
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HIGHWAY.
Legislative Power-Retrospective Statutes.-When the legislature, by
a valid exercise of its authority, has conferred a power to act, and pre-
scribed the mode of action, a substantial compliance with the mode will
be essential to a valid exercise of the power. But if the power be de-
fectively or irregularly exercised, and for that reason invalid, the legis-
lature may, by subsequent action, cure any such defect or irregularity,
the requirement of which was originally within its discretion, and if its
power over the subject was plenary, its power of confirmation will be
absolute: People ex rel. Bristol v. Board of ,Siervisors, 20 Mich.
The legislature have full power within certain constitutional limita-
tions, over the subject of laying out, altering, or discontinuing high-
ways; and this power they may exercise directly: Art. 4, § 23 of the
Constitution, which 'declares that the legislature shall not vacate or alter
any road laid out by commissioners of highways, is -equivalent to the
express affirmation of the power to vacate or alter a state road. And
this power they may delegate to the Board of Supervisors : Id.
The right to pass and -repass upon a highway, of persons the value
of whose property might be affected by its discontinuance, but who are
not owners of the land through which the portion proposed to be dis-
continued passes, can hardly be looked upon as a vested right of pro-
perty, which it would not he competent for the legislature to take away
and, even if they were entitled to compensation, the law makes full
provision for ascertaining and adjusting it: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Right of Wife to carry on Business.-A. married woman, having a
separate estate, may purchase a boat and carry on the business of boat-
ing, on her sole account: Whedon v. CGanmplin, 59 Barb.1
There is nothing in the statute which limits the kind of business
a married woman may carry on. Nor is there any prohibition against
her employing her husband as master, or captain of the boat: Id.
Rights of iusband's Creditors.--Oreditorm have no lien on the hus-
band's labor, nor is there any way by which they can force him to labor
for them. He may give his labor to a third person for his board, wash-
ing, and clothing, and the creditors have no way to prevent it. So he
may give his labor to his wife, upon the same terms: Td.
After he has acquired property by his labor, his creditors may follow
it; and if he has invested it in the name of his wife, or expended it to
enhance the value of her separate property, a resulting trust may arise
in their favor, to the extent of the moneys thus invested: Id.
The question, in all cases of this class, is one of fraud; and, like
other kindred questions, must be submitted to the jury, either when
the evidence is conflicting, or when the circumstances are of such a
character as to'create doubt or uncertainty: Id.
Estoppel against Wife.-An execution against the husband was levied
upon a canal-boat, and the wife joined in a receipt to the sheriff. The
execution was subsequently paid. Another creditor of the husband
afterwards issued an execution, which was levied upon the same boat.
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Held, that the wife was not estopped from showing title to the boat, as
against this second execution: Id.
An admission by the wife, to a third person, that the boat belonged
to her husband, would not be binding as an estoppel, in favor of others
whose conduct had not been influenced by it : Id.
Divorce on account of Impotence-Jurisdiction of Courts of Eguity
in' Applications for Divorce-Deed of Separation.-Where, by organic
defect of the female, existing at the time of marriage, there cannot be
;era copula between the parties, and the defect is permanent and in-
curable, the case comes within the legal definition of impotence, and
will authorize a divorce a vinculo: J. G. v. R. G., 33 Md.
Courts of equity in this state, on applications for a divorce, sit not
in the exercise of their ordinary equitable jurisdiction, but as divorce
courts, and must be governed by the rules and principles established in
the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, so far as they are consistent with
the provisions of the Code: Id.
A voluntary deed of separation between husbgnd and wife, is not a
bar to a bond fide application by the former for a divorce from the
latter, on the ground of her impotence at the time of marriage: Id.
Abandonment-Divorce a mensa et thoro.-Abandonment, to consti--
tute a sufficient cause for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, must be the
deliberate act of the party complained against, done with the intent
that the marriage relation should no longer exist: Lynch v. Lynch, 33
Md.
Violent and outrageous conduct on the part of the wife, towards the
husband, rendering the proper discharge of the duties of married life
impossible, is sufficient ground for a divorce a mensa et thoro : Id.
Right of Husband to Wife's Personal Estate upon her Death.-A
testator bequeathed to his daughter certain leasehold property, for her
sole and separate use and benefit, without being subject to the control
or disposal of her husband, if she should marry, or liable for his debts.
The share of the daughter under the residuary clause of the will was
also declared to be for her sole and separate use and benefit, independent
of the control of any future husband. The daughter became possessed
of the property bequeathed to her by her father's will, and subsequently
married. She died intestate and without issue, her husband surviving
her. Held, that the personal property of the wife, limited to her sole
and separate use by the will of her father, passed upon her death,
intestate and without issue, to her husband in his own right: Cooney
Adm'r v. Woodburn, 33 Did.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Negligence.
MORTGAGE.
Tort for Fraudulent Conversion of Property.-Property described in
a chattel mortgage, and which is taken out from its operation by a
fraudulent contrivance of the mortgagor, is wrongfully converted; for
which an action of tort may be maintained, and the defendant held to
bail: Matter of Hicks, 20 Mich.
Sale of Chattels- Conditional Delivery.-Upon a sale of personal
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property,-machinery, designed to be fixed to realty,-a part of the
purchase price being paid in cash, and the balance secured by chattel
mortgage on the same property, which, however, was not to be delivered
until the owner of the realty should endorse upon the mortgage his
recognition of the rights of the mortgagee, the title passes on the day
of the sale; the delivery only is suspended until such recognition is
endorsed: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Railroad.
Evidence-Presumption in favor of Railroad Companies in actions
for injuries to Employees-Reputation of unfitness of Employee who
caused the injury-Burden of Proof-Special Directions.-In a suit
brought by a railroad employee against the company for damages caused
by the alleged unskilfulness or negligence of another employee of the
same company, the defendants are entitled to the benefit of the pre-
sumption that they exercised due care in the employment of the person
charged with unskilfulness, or negligence, and that they had no know-
ledge of the defects of capacity or character imputed : Davis v. D. and
M. Railroad Co., 20 Mioh.
General reputation of unfitness would be admissible as evidence, and
might be sufficient to chargelthe company with knowledge, notwithstand-
ing they may have been actually ignorant of it. The ignorance will be
negligence in a case in which any proper inquiry would have obtained
the necessary information, and where the duty to inquire was plainly
imperative. But the burden of proof to establish the unfitness alleged
as the ground of the plaintiff's action, and the defendant's knowledge
of it, is upon the plaintiff: 1.
A railroad employee having knowledge of the unfitness of another
employee of the same company, or one whose position or duties are such
that he ought to be acquainted With such unfitness, when it had become
notorious; and who does not give information to the company of the
unfitness thus actually or constructively known to him, takes upon him-
self all the risks of injury from such unfitness, while engaged in the
ordinary performance of his duties, as much as if he had expressly con-
tricted with reference to possible injuries from that cause : Id.
Where the reasons which are relied upon to charge the officers of the
company *ith knowledge, apply with equal force to show the knowledge
of the plaintiff, the negligence of the latter in net complaining is as
great as that of the company in employing an incompetent person; and
where employer and employee have equal knowledge, and the latter con-
tinues the service, each party takes the risk, unless the employer under-
takes to give special directions. A direction by a railroad officer to his
subordinate to perform an ordinary service such as his employment
contemplated, there being nothing unusual in the mode directed, is not
such a special direction as will charge the company for an injury hap-
penii; during the performance of such service : Id.
RAILROAD. See Negligence.
Special Rieks incident to proximity to Railroads-Liabilty of Com-
panies.-The care which a railroad company must exercise in the run-
Ring of trains so as not to injure property situated near their track, is
not contingent upon such circumstances as the force and direction of
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the wind, the dryness of the weather, or the combustible character of
property liable to be affected. The company not being in fault as to the
quality or character of their equipments, the special risks incident to
proximity to railroad trains must be borne by those who establish them.
selves in such localities: Michigan (entral Railroad Co. v. Anderson,
20 Mich.
Negliqence-Evidence.-Where the petition alleges the cause of
plaintiff's injury to arise from a defective track, the defect in the track
anywhere way be shown, if it contributed to the injury: Union Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Band, 6 or 7 Kansas.
Railroad companies are required to use the utmost human sagacity
and foresight in the construction of roads, to prevent accidents: Id.
Where the amount of damages assessed in a verdict shows that.the
jury was influenced by passion and prejudice, it is the duty of the court
to order a new trial of the case: Id.
SALE.
Sale of Real Estate to fix Con tract Liabilities-Notice.-In making
a sale of real estate in order to fix a contract liability, the .sale must be
made within a reasonable time, and conducted in a reasonable manner.
And if the sale be by auction, the analogies of sales under legal process
will furnish the rule as to notice; and these prescribe a notice of at
least six weeks: Eldridge v. Bliss, 20 Mich.
SEDUCTION.
Breach of Promise of Marriage-Damages.-In an action to recover
damages for the breach of a promise of marriage, evidence was offered
of the promise and of the breach, and also of a subsequent seduction
of the plaintiff by the defendant; and'there was evidence tending to
show that the seduction was accomplished by means of the promise of
marriage. Held, that the jury were warranted, in estimating the dam-
ages, to consider the fact of seduction: Sauer v. Schulenbery, 33 Md.
SHIPPING.
Mortgage of Vessel-Assignment-Rights of'Assignee-Equities of
Mortgagors.-The assignee of a mortgage of a vessel takes it with all
the rights and powers which were possessed by the mortgagee; and no
equities existing between several mortgagors will deprive the assignee
of any of the usual remedies for the enforcement of the security:
Dalrympl& v. Sheehan, 20 Mich.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Although it is a matter of discretion whether specific performance
will in any case be granted, yet the discretion must be exercised accord-
ing to certain well-established rules, and does not rest in the mere .aprice
of the judge: Foot v. Webb, 59 Barb.
TENANT IN COMMON.
Ejectment against Co-ten ant.-The possession of one tenant in common
being in law the possession of all the co-tenants, a tenant in common
cannot bring ejectment against. his co-tenant unless there has been an
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ouster. The ouster need not be accompanied by positive force, but may
be established by acts and declarations brought home to the knowledge
of the co-tenant : Hammond v. Morrison's Lessee, 33 Md.
TRovEm. See Mortgagee.
TRUSTS AND TRusTEs. See Auction.
Purchases by Trustees, at their own Sales.-A trustee making a sale
of the trust property, cannot become a purchaser on his own account,
either directly or through the aid of another: Terwilliger v. Brown
et al., 59 Barb.
Thus, if an executor selling property under the order of the surro-
gate, for the payment of debts, becomes himself interested in a purchase
thereof made by one employed by him to act as auctioneer, and who
thus becomes his sub-agent, a residuary devisee may come into a court
of equity and set aside the sale, and have the property resold: Id.
Upon a sale of lands, by an executor, under an order of the surro-
gate, for the payment of debts, B. officiating as auctioneer, struck off
the premises t6 himself. Before the confirmation of the sale, the pay-
ment of the purchase-money, or the delivery of the deed to B., an
arrangement was made between him and the executor, by which the
latter became equally interested with the !ormer in the purchase of the
property. The sale was confirmed by the surrogate, and a conveyance
of the premises executed, by the executor to B., who, on the same day,
conveyed an equal undivided half of said premises to the executor.
Held, that neither B. ndr the executor could be protected against the
claims of those interested in the estate directed to be sold; the pur-
chase being a palpable violation of the statute, and in direct hostility to
the well-established principle that a trustee shall not be allowed, directly
or indirectly, to speculate out of the trust property, or to become a
purchaser thereof for his own benefit: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Agreement; Sale.
WATER.
Right to Erect and Maintain Barriers.-Where a stream running
across the defendant's land, and thence upon the plaintiff's land below,
during a flood broke through its bank, making an opening sufficient to
carry all the water ordinarily running, and through this new channel
the water would have continued to run, if not prevented, .ield, that
the defendant had a right, for his own protection, to erect a barrier or
levee across the crevasse or new channel, for the purpose of confining
the waters within their original channel; provided he did not build such
barrier too high, nor project it into the stream, so as to prevent the
water running in its accustomed channel and with its usual force:
Pierce v. Kinney, 59 Barb.
1ield, also, that the defendant was not bound to keep the original
channel of the creek open, upon his own lands, as a condition to his
right to maintain such barrier. And that he was not liable to the
plaintiff for any damages that might ensue from a failure to do so: II.
